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FOREWARD
A computer concepts study was conducted at the IBM Electronics Sys-
tems Center at Owego, New York, under IBM Contract NAS 9-4570, for the
Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas. The objective of the study was
to investigate possible solutions to long term and time critical reliability
problems as they affect the Apollo Command Module guidance and control
computer in its application to the AES mission. Volume I of this final
report presents a summary of the work performed during the study, and
Volume II presents detailed technical descriptions of the various
investigations.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The study described by this report was performed under contract
NAS 9-4570 for the Manned Spacecraft Center, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, Houston, Texas. Although a specific mis-
sion and a specific computer subsystem were used as models for the
study, the individual investigations were conceptual in nature rather
than attempts to apply existing equipment or techniques. E:tch concept
was investigated to the level required to provide a satisfactory degree
of confidence in the feasibility of applying that concept to the specified
mission.
1.1 Scope
The study consisted of an investigation of the application of the
Saturn V computer and a redundant version of the Apollo backup data
adapter as a means of meeting the reliability and mission requirements
of a 90-day Earth Polar Orbit (EPO) Apollo Extension System (AES)
mission. P:_ckaging; reliability; fault detection and isolation; inflight
maintenance in high humidaty, zero gravity environments; optimum
sparing level; module and channel switching; and other pertinent items
were studied in an attempt to determine the required redesign of the
subject computer and data adapter subsystem to enable it to meet the
guidance and control functional requirements and reliability apportion-
ment of a typical 90-day AES-EPOmission. Limited fabrication
demonstrating an approach to sparing in a high humidity, zero gravity
environment was also required.
1.2 Objective
The objective of this study was to investigate possible solutions
to long-term and time-critical reliability problems as they affect the
Apollo Command Module guidance and control computer and its ap-
plications to AES missions. Specifically, the Saturn V Triple Modular
Redundant (TMR) computer and a redundant version of the Apollo
backup data adapter were investigated as a means of solving the time
critical reliability problem° A detailed investigation of in/light maiii-
tenance or module and channel switching of the computer and data
adapter were investigated as a means of solving the long term reli-
ability problem.
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1.3 Approach
The Saturn V computer and a redundant version of the Apollo
backup data adapter were examined to determine how their packaging,
reliability and machine organization could be improved to meet the
requirements of extended Apollo missions. Several concepts and aN
ternate techniques were investigated as solutions for each of the "prob-
lem areas" uncovered by examination of this basic computer system.
A reconfigured subsystem was derived by selecting the best solution
for each problem area.
2.0 REQUIREMENTS
The investigation performed under this coutract was directed
toward making the subject computer and data adapter subsystem
capable of meeting AES requirements. The principle inputs were
mission profile, reliability apportionment, and Block II ApoI_o Guid-
ance and Control Computer requirements. To avoid duplication of
effort between this study and contract NAS 9-3724 (Apollo Backup
Study), a rigorous verification that the AES configuration will meet
the Block II Apollo functional requirements was deferred to the backup
computer study. Care was taken, however, to assure that the mem-
ory capacity of the AES computer was sufficient for the mission and
that the computation speed was faster than the Block II Apollo cow-
puter.
2.1 Mission Profile
A 90-day earth polar orbit mission profile was considered for
evaluating system requirements necessary to meet the apportioned
reliability. The profile was divided for the purpose of analysis into
four prim_wy phases: launch, polar orbit injection, orbit adjustment,
and re-entry. The profile for boost and orbit injection is shown in
Figure 1, and the profile for deboost and re-entry is shown in Figure
2.
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The primary function of the AES computer dur_mg boost is to
monitor the guidance and control of the Saturn vehicle. Guidance
during the entire S-IC stage burn period is in accordance with a pre-
deterL_ined time-tilt program. An iterative guidance mode (path
adaptive guidance) is used for the S-If and S-IVB powered flight phases.
Cutoff of the S-IC and S-If stages occurs when the fuel is depleted to a
predetermined level, while cutoff of the S-IVB occurs when the veloc-
ity for orbital injection is attained, The functions which must be
monitored _nd the parameters which must be computed by the AES
subsystem during boost include:
1) Navigation monitoring--determine velocity vector, per-
form coordinate transfer, calculate present position,
project gravity vector, generate a gyro drift correction,
and determine vehicle attitude;
Coast, Transpose,j_ 200-nmi PolarOrbit
and Dock-
SM Light
S-IVB Shutdown t = 66 rnin
t = 640 sec Burnt_rne140 sec
S-II Burnout S-IVB
t = 543 sec lO0-nmi ReJight
Parking Burntime392 sec
Orbit
LESJettison
t = 174 sec
_-IC Burnout
t = 150 sec
SaturnV Launch
t=O
Figure 1. Earth Polar Orbit Mission Profile (with Laboratory)
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2) Guidance monitoring--compute steering commands,
required velocity, engine cutoff times;
3) Control monitoring-engine ignition, engine cutoff,
ullage rocket fire, stage jettison;
4) Telemetry transmission of monitored data.
The time periods for the three phases of boost are:
1) S-IC burn- 0.042 hours,
2) S-II burn-- 0. 110 hours,
3) S-IV2 burn- 0. 027 hours,
4) Total (from SOW)-- 0o 2fi0 hours
Separate
From SM Light
200-nmi Orbit Laboratory Burntlme 18 sec
= mm CM/f, "V,q::.paration
._1_ :--400,000 ft\\
t=6
3-__ h = 40,000 ft
Parachute
_. Deployment
Figure 2. Deboost and Re-entry from Earth Orbit
r
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Th¢ primary function of the AES computer during orbit injection
(transfer from 100-mile parking orbit to 200-mile EPO) is also to
monitor the guidance and control of the vehicle. The AES compute_:
must be capable of providing backup guidar.ce and control with an
injection accuracy of 10 nautical miles (one sigma). The time periods
for orbital injection and docking are:
1) S-IVB burn --0. 110 hours,
?_ SM burn -- 6. 040 hours.
The AES computer subsystem is required to control vehicle
attitude during orbital operations. The required attitude deadband is
+0.50 degrees (all axes) and the allowable drift rates are ±0. 02 de-
grees per second (about zero for two axes and about the orbital rate
for the third axis). Powered phases for orbit maintenance are not
considered critical for the purposes of this ,_tudy.
Guidance and control of the command module (CM) and service
module (SM) are required of the AES computer suL :ystem during re-
entry. This function was examined in detail under contract N2_S
9-3724 (the Apollo Backup Study) and the results were factored into
Task C (machine organization tradeoffs). The event sequence for re-
entry from the contract statement of work is:
Time (rnin) Event
0 Start re-entry preparations
55. 0 Service mod_e ignition
55.3 Service module shutdown
69. 0 CM/SM separation
77. 0 h = 400, 000 feet
83-90 Parachute deployment (h = 40, 000 feet).
2.2 Environmental Conditions
The environmental requirements for Apollo as defined in
specification ND 1002037 were considered valid for AES missions.
5
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The effects of severe envirohmental conditions occurring during por-
tions of the mission were taken into account in the reliability calcula-
tions by applying severity factor_ to the estimated failure rates (or
operating times). Table l shows the basic environmental conditions
to which the equipment was assumed to be subjected during the various
phases of the missiGn profile,
TABLE 1 -- AES 90-Day EPO Environmental Conditions
Prelaunch Launch Orbit Re-entry
Vibration None 10-62 cps Negligible Negligible
0. 0025-0. 015
g2/cps
62- 380 cps I
0. 015 g2/cps I
380-2000 cps
0. 015-0. 003
g2/cps
Acceleration None 6 g None I0 g
Temperature 20°F to 140°F 20°F to 140°F 20°F to 100°F 20°F to 140OF
Shock None 20 g None (Earthlanding)
78 g
Climatic 100% Oxygen J00% Oxygen 100% Oxygen 100% Oxygen
100% RH 100% RH 100% RH 100% RH
The noncritical phases of the mission occur during orbit and axe
used as the baseline reference for the environmental stresses with a
severity factor of unity. The critical phases occur during powered
flight and include launch, polar orbit injection, oruit adjustment, and
re-entry.
The latmch phase is composed of three subphases with varying
environmentai stresses as shown in Table 2. Launch is initiated by
the Saturn-IC booster, which causes the greatest stress to the equip-
merit - 75 times that imposed by orbital envirunmental conditions.
" This subphase is followed by the Saturn-II stage burn which imposes
50 times the baseline stress, which is in turn followed by the Saturn-
!V_Bphase with a 35 times stress factor.
6
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TABLE 2 -- Launch Stress Factors
, L
Time
Subphase (T) (hrs) K Factor T × K
Saturn-IC 9. 042 75 3.15
Saturn-II 0. Ii0 50 5.50
Saturn-IVB 0.027 35 0. 945
Total 0. 179 9. 595
l
Launch K Factor =9. 595/0. 179 = 54
The effective time for each launch subphase is calculated in
Table 2 by multiplying the actual time that each subphase exists by
the corresponding stress factor. The effective stress factor for the
entire launch phase is then calculated by dividing the sum of the effec-
tive time periods by the sum of the actual time periods.
During polar orbit injection, thrust is applied to the vehicle by
reignition of the Saturn-IYB stage. The stress factor of 35 is applied
for the 0. 11 hours of burn time. Thrust for orbit adjustment is pro-
vided by the service module engine after jettison of the Saturn-IVB
stage, and a factor of 25 is applied for 0.04 hours.
The 1.5 hours of critical mission phase designated as re-entry
actually includes the time in orbit required to prepare for the re-entry
maneuver. It is assumed that the re-entry maneuver will take a maxi-
mum of 35 minutes so the orbital factor of 1.0 will be applied for 55
minutes of the 1.5 hours. The re-entry maneuver also consists of two
subphases, deboost and re-entry. Deboost is accomplished by re-
ignition of the service module engine. Re-entry stresses are imposed
by the acceleration and aerodynamic forces caused by the spacecraft
entering the earth's atmosphere. A composite re-entry factor is
developed in Table 3 which summarizes the severity factors for each
critical mission phase.
7
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TABLE 3 -- Re-entry Stress Factors
I
Subphase Time K Factor [ T >:K
.L -, t
Re-entry Prep. 0.92 1.0 0.92
Deboost 0.005 25.0 5.80
Re-entry 0.58 10.0 0.125
Total 1.505 6.845
. i o
Re-entry K Factor= 6.845/1.505 = 4.5
The resulting stress factors for each of the critical phases are
summarized zn Table 4 and the corresponding effective time periods
calculated by multiplying each severity factor by the actual time dur-
ing which it is imposed. The "most critical phase" was found to be
launch, si,,ce it produced the largest effective time of 10.8 hours.
Launch was therefore chosen as the phase upon which the computed
short term reliabilities were based in the study.
TABLE 4- Missio: Severity Factors
r , | •
Phase Operating Time(Hours) Severity Factor T x K
Launch 0.20 54.0 I0.80
Polar OrbitInjection 0.11 35.0 3.85
OrbitAdjustment 0.04 25.0 ].00
Re-entry 1.50 4.5 6.75
L. | .
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2.3 Reliability
Reliability calculations were made on the basis of the mission
profile described in Section 2.1. All charnels of the computer and
data adapter were required to be operative prior to any critical mis-
sion phase, since repair was not aUowed during these periods. Re-
pair was allowed, however, during noncritical mission _hases.
Reliability calculations were based on duty cycl: s of 25, 50, and
100 i_ercent of the noncritical phase time combined with the 1.85 hours
of the critical phase ti:ne. Reliability was calculated on the "o_,,,,,.__ -'_,,.
both a zero failure tale as well as a non-zero failure rate for compo-
nent electrical cff-time. The system required to meet the apportioned
reliability was the syst._,m based on zero failure rate for off-time.
The apportioned computer-data adapter reliability w_s specified
as 0. 9994 for the missY.on and 0. 999999 for the critical phases. A
reliability of ur.ity w_s assumed for the Apollo display and keyboard.
Detai.led failure rate data was compiled irom an extensive IBM
program ior collecting and analyzing component part failure data.
In addition to observed test and operational data, the failure rates for
this study were based on analysis of selected failed parts which re-
bred the causes of the failu.-e to basic failure mechanisms peculiar
to the part type. From this information, failure rates of parts on
which little data was available were formulated by reduction of the part
into its basic failure mechanisms. The resulting failure rates axe
shown in Table 5.
TABLE 5 -- Component Failure Rates
Component Part Type % E.S. kOp ),Non-op
I -- I
Transistors
Leadless <_10 0,012 0.0023
Leadless,Matched Pair <_10 0.030 0.0048
Silicon,Planar, InStitchedWelded ! f < 10 0.011 0.001
Can I < 50 0.017 0.001
Silicon,Planar, Matched Pair, In j" _<.10 0.028 0.002
StitchedWelded Can [ <_.50 0.042 0.002
Silicon,Alloy,Power _<50 0.080 0.0036
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TABLE 5 --Component FailureRates (cont)
Component Part Type % E.S. Op Non-op
Diodes
Dual, Leadless, }:_lf Used _<10 0. 007 0. 0016
Dual, Leadless, Both Halves Used <_I0 0.006/half 0. 0012
Zener, Discrete _<50 0. 030 0. 002
Silicon, Planar_ Micro _<10 0. 003 0.0006
Silicon, Planar, Rectifier _<50 0. 050 0. 0015
Resistors
Cermet (ULD Type) <_.30 0. 068 0.001
Metal Film, Precision <_30 0. 010 0. 0015
Molded, Carbon Comp., Nonher-
metically Sealed _<30 0.003 0.0006
Variable, Trimmer _ 10 0.0_0 0. 015
Temperature Sensing, Memory 0. 010 0. 010
,, _,,
Capacitors
i
Glass _<10 C. 001 0. 0004
Ceramic < 30 0. 010 0. 0005
Tantalum, Solid Section <_.50 0.030 0. 0014
Connections
Unitor Page Comnector Body 0.003 0.003
Active ConnectorPins, Per Pair 0.001 0.0005
Flow Solder 0.001 0.00028
Hand Solder,Memory Frame 0.0005 0.0002
SolderFillet(ULD) 0.001 0.001
Hand Solder,Memory Address Wire 0.0002 0.0002
Sense or InhibitWire 0.00028 0.00028
Splice 0.00036 0.00036
Chip-to-Conductor, Pattern/Ball 0.0005 0.0005
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TABLE 5 -- Cnmponent FailureRates (cont)
Component Part Type % E.S. Op Non-op
i
Miscellancous
Core, Toroidal,T-38 0.0001 0.0001
Cable, Flexible,Tape, Per Length 0.0006 0.0006
Choke, Filter,Power < 50 0.12 0.002
Choke, R.F. 0.10 0.002
Crystal,Oscillator 0.50 0.003
Delay Line, Glass 0.30 0.0025
P.C. Strip,Memory 0.0001 0.0001
MIB (1page side) 0.553 0.553
MIB (backpanel) 3.762 3.762
Transformer, Signal < 50 0.43 0.004
Transformer, Power <_.50 0.70 0.004
Wire, Memory, Per Wire 0.0001 0.0001
Transformer, Pulse 0.100 0.004
"S Clip",IncludingJoint-to-Land
Pattera 0.0005 0.0005
Wrap-Around I._tnd,ULD 0.0004 0.0004
ULD Conductor Pattern 0.0001 0.0001
Substrates 0.0001 0.0001
% E.S. = Expected percentofelectricalstressratings
k Op = Operatingfailuresper 10+6 component hours
Non-op = Non-operatingfailuresper 10+6 component hours
11
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3.0 SUMMARY
The _Cudy was divided into four primary areas of investigat-gn:
1) packaging, 2) machine organization, 3) error detection and diag_nesis, and 4) fabrication and test. The packaging study was aimed
primarily at deriving packaging techniques applicable to operation and
t maintenance in the high humidity, zero gravity AES environment. Theprincipal goals of the machine organization study wer attainment of
the extremely high reliability requirement of the AES critical phases
and realization of automatic error detection and diagnosJ s. Error
__ detection and diagnosis studies using the Saturn V Syster_ Simulator
provided insight to the mechanisms of error propagation in a digital
t system and produced the data necessary for the machine organization
effort. The fabrication and test effort included fabrication of a com-puter/data adapter mockup, fabrication of representative module pack-
ages and a special environmental chamber in which to test them, ex-
I ploratory tests to determine a satisfactory connector-sealing technique,and evaluation tests of the repre entative modul s.
i In general, all phases of the study were successful. A packagingapproach was derived which is suitable for operation and maintenance
in the adverse AES environment. The reliability requirement of
0. 999999 for the critical phases of the AES mission was met by the
TMR machine organization which evolved during the study. The re-liability requirement of 0. 9994 for the 90-day mission was met either
by sparing or by automatic repartitioning of the computer system in
i flight. Automatic error detection was proved by simulation to be
l feasible with an efficiency of better than 99 percent without interrupting
normal machine operation (without special test programs or routines).
i Automatic fault isolation to a replaceable module level was achievedby built-in circuits. A logic circuit was designed which not only pro-
vides the voting, error detection, and fault isolation functions, but
automatically switches out the failed component.
No extensive tradeoffs were required or performed during the
study. For example, no other forms of redundancy other than triple
modutar redundancy or variations such as quad redundancy were con-
: sidered. Similarly, no tradeoffs were made between built-in test
circuitry and test programming. As a result, the selected conf_gura-
i tion probably is not optimum for the application although it does meetall the requirements specified by NASA-MSC or o erwise known to
IBM.
I"
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The extremely high reliabilities specified for the AES-EPO
mission are reasonable in that they can be met by conventional TMR
organization, simple packaging techniques, and existing diagnostic
methods. Further investigations would be required to determine
whether the automatic repair techniques developed during the study
would be worth the cost of the additioJml eqmpment complexity when
compared to manual module replacement.
3.1 Packaging
Several approaches were investigated for packaging the com-
puter and data adapter for operation and maintenance in the high
humidity, zero gravity AES environment. A decision was made early
in the study to package the computer and data adapter in a single unit
in order to simplify the interconnection problems. Although this
decision affects the overall form factor and size of the computer sys-
tem, it does not affect the relative merits of the various approaches
considered or the conclusions of the packaging studies.
The first approach was the conventional packaging technique for
aerospace computers in which the computer system is sealed as a
malt. Upon removing the unit cover to replace a failed module, the
entire interior of the unit is exposed to the spacecraft environment.
When the cover is replaced after repair, the free moisture and con-
; taminants trapped in the unit must be purged and the unit repressurized
to somewhat greater than cabin pressure with dry gas.
In the second and third approaches an attempt was made to
limit the degree of exposure during a maintenance action by sealing
various portions of the computer independently. Since a TMR com-
puter consists of essentially three individual computers, each channel
can be sealed individually so that only a third of the computer is ex-
posed each time a repair is attempted. In the Saturn V computer, the
casting is designed such that each logic channel is partitioned into
effectively five physical cells. If each cell is separately sealed, then
a fifteenth or less of the computer is exposed each time a repair is
: attempted.
In each case the covers woulcl be sealed by means of modified
0-rings and the exposed volume purged and repressurized with dry
: gas to an overpressure of two or three psi. Gasket-sealed units have
: been designed at IBM to provide leakage rates as low as 10-7 cubic
_ centimeters per second per inch of linear seal length.
;._
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Tr_deoffs between the three sealing approaches were made on
the basis of leakage rates, expected repair intervals, module re-
placeability, and design complexity. Although each method possessed
, certain advantages ever the other two, the cell-sealing approach was
selected primarily because it provided minimum circuit exposure over
the 90-day mission and because it provided easiest access to a failed
module, but at a cost in size, weight, and probably cost of fabrication.
Closed loop systems were considered but not emphasized in the
study. A pressurized system which circulates dehumidified air
through the computer and contains filters for chemical contaminants
has, at least, history in aircraft applications. The use of freon in a
closed loop or even static system offers several advantages including
moisture-repellent characteristics.
No matter what packaging approach is selected for application
in an adverse environment, the problem of sealing the connectors
remains a problem. Although the connectors associated with the
pluggable mod.Aes are partially protected in any of the approaches
described above, the cable connectors which connect the computer
system with other systems remain exposed to the spacecraft environ-
ment. Study emphasis was therefore given to connector sealing tech-
nique s.
Exploratory testing of various sealing techniques indicated that
a combination of gasket sealing and silicone gel loading of the con-
nectors appeared to solve the com_ector sealing problem. The test
results were so successful, in fact, that the packaging approach se-
lected for the AES computer system eliminated sealing of the replace-
able modular area as shown in Figure 3. Each replaceable module
is sealed individually and chassis sealing is limited to unreplaceable
items such as back panels and interconnecting wiring.
In the exploratory tests of various cormector-sealing techniques,
a male and female Saturn V page connector were wired and sealed
with epoxy on their rear surfaces as shown in Figure 4. A silicone
rubber gasket was glued to the face of the female connector with Dow-
Corning Ag-4000. The female cap was removed and DC-3 silicone
grease packed inside the connector. The pins of the male connector
were also saturated with DC-2 silicone grease. Contact measure-
ments (made with 40 contacts connected in series) before and after
application of silicone grease indicated that the grease had no measur-
able effects on the contact resistance between male and female con-
"_ nections. Leakage resistance checks between adjacent pins showed no
appreciable change in megger readings even when disconnected o.-_.d
reconnected while immersed in a bath of sait water.
14
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_oxy
Gonnector
Gasket
Screws
Cap Gasket
Conncctor
Epoxy
'Cable
Figure 4. Exploratory Test Model
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Although individual sealing of the replaceable modu:es and applica-
tion of the above connector-seahng technique would seem to solve the
packaging problem for operation and maintenance in the adverse AF3
environment, a detailed data analysis of test results on contact materi-
als was performed to assure that the properties of the contact materials
wouL' not present a problem in the AES application. This analysis re-
sulted in the recommendation of gold-on-nickle as the contact material,
as in the Saturn V connectors, but with the thickness of the gold platit,_
increased from about 50 mils to 200 mils. If the increased plating
thickness and stringent quality control methods prove to be inadequate
in controlling plating porosity, a technique for welding gold foil on base
contact materials has been proven feasible at IBM but not as yet used
because of the higher fabricaL_on costs involved. Although the recom-
mended process will result in expensive connectors, their performance
in the adverse AES environment seems assured and worth the cost.
3.2 MachineOrganization
The Saturn" computer and a redundant version of the Apollo
backup data adaptt," were used as a basic system for the machine or-
ganization studies. This basic computer system was analyzed fur its
reliability, error detection, failure isolation, and performance capa-
bilities and changes to the machine organization made to improve the
weak areas uncovered by the analysis.
Simulation oi _,te reliability model for the basic .3ystem revealed
tha* neither the time critical nor long term reliabilities were met by the
basic system without sparing, as indicated in Table 6. In order to im-
Frove system reliability (especially in the critical mission phases), the
simplex computer oscillator and tim duplex memories and the duplex
pov,er supplies were triplicated. A novel oscillator configuration was
designed in which three unsynchronized oscillators operate in parallel
and are selectively gated into the system according to error detector
indications. TMR memories provide a reliability increase by forcing
error-causing disagreements from the word level of the duplex con-
figura'_mn to the bit level of TMR voting. Triplex power supplies with
overlapping duplex distribution nets were selected as the power system
for the reorganized computer system.
Two machine organization areas which were investigated with the
purpose of improving system reliability but which were not factored
into the reliability computations were grounding and transiec _,protec-
tion. The grounding scheme of the Satuln V system was retained in
general but revised in detail to reduce interaction of ground _urrents,
17
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I
I Table 6 -- Reliability Estimates (Basic System)
Mission Reliability
1 'Element Critical Non-op k > 0 Non-op k = 0
Phase 100% .....
j 50% 25% 50% 25%I
Computer 0.999933 0.8879 0.9272 0.9446 0.9647 0.9886
Oscillator 0.999992 0.9984 0.9989 0.9992 0.9992 0.9996|
•l Logic 0.999998 0.9334 0.9580 0.9686
0. 9809 0. 9947
Memory 0.999942 0.9528 0.9689 0.9760 0.9843 0.9943
i
] Data Adapter 0.999989 0.8096 0.8921 0.9272 0.9429 0.9840
4 P_wer Supply 0.999995 0.9980 0.9988 0.9992 0.9992 0.9997
._ogic ! 0.999994 0.8113 0.8932 0.9280 0.9436 0.9843
J Computer System 0.999921 0.7189 0.8272 0.8759 0.9096 0.9728
especially at the module interfaces and in the memory modules. Iso-
lated ground planes were provided for the memory modules, since
these are the most noise-critical elements in the computer system, but
at the cost of transformer-coupled drive circuits and addition of differ-
ential amplifiers in the sense lines.
The results of the transient susceptibility tests of the C_mlni com-puter were reviewed to determine their applicability to the AES computer
organization. The most transient-sensitive areas of the digital circuits
were found to be the memory sense lines and the output lines of the de-lay line sense amplifiers. Reduction of the susceptibility of the basic
computer organization to voltage transients can be achieved in the re-
] organized system by improving the physical layout of the sense lines,
limiting the bandwidth of the sense amplifiers, providing alternate
strobing of the TMR memories, and isolating the memory ground planes.
_I A logiccircuitwas developedduringthe studywhich votes on the
I
triplexlogic, detectsa disagreementbetween the three inputstothe
voter,isolatesthe error toone ofthethree inputs,and turns offthe
t faulty input and one of the two good inputs. If a failure occurs in amodule, this logic circuit effectively switches down that module to a.
simplex operating mode. An automatic TMR/Simplex operating mode
was therefore provided for the reorganized system in which one ormore modul s operat simplex while th rest of the system operates
TMR. The reliability estimates for the reorganized computer system
"1
,Jm
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in the TMR/Simplex mode of operation are given in Table 8. Although
the TMR/Simplex mode provides reliability improvement over the con-
ventional TMR mode (Table 7), sparing is still required to meet the re-
liability requirement of 0.9994 for the 90-day mission.
TABLE 7 -- Reliability Estimates (Reorganized System)
Mission Reliability
Element Critical Non-op ), >0 Non-op k = 0
Phase 100%
50% 25% 50% 25%
Computer 0.9999994 0.9787 0.9888 0.9930 0.9943 0.9984
Logic >0.9999999 0.9996 0.9998 0.9999 0.9999 >0.9999
Memory >0.9999994 0.9791 0.9892 0.9931 0.9944 0.9985
Data Adapter 0°9999997 0.9910 0.9953 0.9969 0.9975 0.9993
Power Supply 0.9999999 0.9999 >0.9999 >0.9999 >0.9999 >0.9999
Logic 0.9999998 0.9911 0.9954 0.9970 0.9976 0.999,t
Computer System 0.999999 0.9699 0.9845 0.9901 0.9920 0.9979
!
TABLE 8 --ReliabilityEstimates (TMR/Simplex Mode)
Mission Reliability
Element Critical Non-op ),>0 Non-op ]k= 0 "
Phase 100%
50% 25% 50% 25%
Computer 0.9999995 0.9817 0.9905 0.9939 0.9951 0.998;
Logic >0.9999999 0.9998 0.9999 0.9999 >0.9999 >0.9999
Memory >0.9999995 0.9819 0.9906 0. 9940 >0.9951 >0.9987
Data Adapter 0.9999999 0.9955 0.9977 0.9985 0.9988 0.9997
Power Supply >0o9999999 0.9999 0.9999 >0.9999 >0.9999 >0.9999
Logic >0.9999999 0.9956 0.9978 >0.9985 >0.9985 >0.9985
Computer System 0. 999999 0.9772 0.9882 0.9924 0.9939 0.9984
19
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The mission reliability can be satisfied with the irfflight spares com-
plement given in Table 9. Neglecting" the critical phase requirements,
the long term reliability can also be met by operating the computer in
a simplex mode and switching in spares from the two non-operating
channels as failures occur in the operating channel.
TABLE 9 -- Spares List
Spare Subassembly Delta Cumulative System
Number Name Reliability Weight (lbs) Reliability
11 Input/Output 0.00737480 0.43 0.97749496
4 Memory Module 0.01608645 4.93 0.99358141
ll Input/Output 0.00071146 5. 36 0.99429286
4 Memory Module 0.00443837 9.86 0.99873123
i Arithmetic 0.00012259 10.29 0.99885383
9 Control 0.00012093 10.72 0.99897,t76
3 Control Timing 0.00011069 11.15 0.99908544
8 Dat_ Flow 0.00009657 II. 58 0. 99918202
7 Time Counter 0.00009165 12.01 0.99927367
6 Input Counter 0.00008464 12.44 0.99935830
10 Processor 0.00008128 12.87 0.99943958
12.87 pounds of spares required
In the Apollo Backup Study it was found that the Saturn V _om-
puter with its ULD (unit logic device) circuit technology did not possess
sufficient computational speed to perform the Apollo control function.
A separate control processor was added to the Apollo data adapter to
handle the control function. A four times speedup in the reorganized
AES computer was realized by increasing the oscillator frequency and
converting from ULD to monolithic integrated circuit (diode-transistor
logic family) technology. The preceding reliability estimates for the
reorganized computer system reflect this shift in circuit technology.
The machine organization study included an investigation of the
effects of breaking up the computer into various levels by modulariza-
tion. This portion of the study was limited tc _he computer (excluded
the data adapter) since data was available on several computers includ-
ing the Sar,,rn V computer.
"_ The increase in circuitry require_ as the Saturn V computer is
partitioned into various numbers of pluggable modules is shown in
Figure 5. Modul3rization was found to have only moderate affect on the
2O
1966011714-025
1.0
I
5 10
ModulesPerCompufer 20 30
Figure 5. Increase ,in Circuitry With Modu/arization
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total amount of circuitry required by the computer organization in the
range from an unmodularized unit to about ten modules. As the com-
puter is partitioned into modules greater than ten, however, the re-
quired circuitry increases very rapidly (primarily because this lower-
level partitioning cuts across functional areas). The Saturn V computer
was organized into seven functional areas but partitioned into more than
ten pluggable modules per channel. The reorganized AES computer was
partitioned into four pluggable modules per channel
The functional relationship between the total intermodule connec-
tions per circuit as the partitioning is carried to lower levels results
in a similarly shaped curve with the break point at about ten modules.
The same general relationship exists between modularization and the
total number of voters required per machine. Although the AES com-
puter was partitioned into four modules primarily to optimize the fail-
ure isolation capabilities of the built-in detection circuitry, this mod-
ularization level is well within the cost constraints of total circuits,
intermodule connections, and total number of voters required.
The data adapter portion of the AES computer system was analyzed
in a similar manner resulting in a partitioning of seven pluggable mod-
ules per channel. The final partitioning of the computer system is sum-
marized in Table 10. Some of the basic characteristics of the reorgan-
ized computer and data adapter are listed in Tables 11 and 12, re-
spectively.
TABLE 10 -- Computer System Partitioning
I
Module Function [ SectionE
1 Memory and Memory Interface Computer
2 Arit.hmetic (Including Mult and Div) Computer
3 Address Registers Computer
4 Control and Timing Computer
5 Output Counter Adapter
6 Input Counter Adapter
7 Time Counter Adapter
8 Data Flow Adapter
9 Control Adapter
10 Processor Adapter
11 Output Drivers Adapter
12 Power Supply Power Supply
13 RFI Filter Power Supply
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TABLE 11 --Computer Characteristics
Type General Purpose, Serial,Fixed Point
Organization TripleModular Redundant, Self-reorganizing,Modularized
Speed 40,000 ops/s, 21 Microsecond Add
Word Length 26 BitData, 13 BitInstruction
Memory Double Density,TMR, 16K EquivalentInstructions
Size 69 Pounds, 1.8 Cubic Feet
Power 102 WaRs (IncludingPower SuppLy)
TABLE 12 --Data Adapter Characteristics
Item Function Description
!
Inputs Discrete 73
Pulsed 33 (Serialand Incremental)
Outputs Discrete 68
Variable Pulsed 43 (Serial, Incremental, Discrete)
Fixed Pulsed 10
Modules Output Counter II (IncludingRegistersand Control),
Gyro and Radar Counter Logic
InputCounter 11 Counters, MuRiplexer, Hand Con-
trolLogic, BootstrapLoader
Time Counter 9 Counters, Pulse Timing
Data Flow Data Exchange Register,Logic,
MuRiplexer
Control 4 DiscreteOutputRegisters,Address
Decode, Controls
Processor Load Register,Down Link Register
and Control,InterruptRegister
Input/Output Simplex Drivers
23
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3.3 Error Detection and Diagnosis
One of the ground rules which was established early in the study
was that error detection _nd diagnosis of the computer system be auto-
matic. An additional ground rule was that the error detection and fault
isolation functions be simultaneous with normal system operation rather
than interwoven or serial with the operational program. To satisfy these
ground rules a built-in test circuit approach was chosen as the primary
method for inflight error detection and diagnosis. No check routines
(such as reasonableness tests), test programs, or diagnostic programs
which would interrupt system operation were considered.
The Saturn V System Simulator was the primary tool for the de-
tection and diagnostic analyses. This simulator consists of a set of
IBM 7090 programs which simulate the detail logic behavior of em.y
digital system which can be logically described on a master tape. One
important feature of the simulator allows the injection of logic fmllts
into the simulated syste_ to examine the phenomenon of error propaga-
tion, and this feature was used to evaluate the error detection and f,_tult
locating capabilities of the built-in test circuitry, Simulator flexibility
also allowed the effects of various partitioning schemes to be evaluated
and thus provided a rapid method for optimally placing voters and error
detectors in the system organization.
In the TMR Saturn V computer and data adapter, disagreement
detectors provide an output if any of the triplicated modules fail, These
detectors consist of a three-way exclusi-,e OR connected to the three
channel inputs to each voter circult. These disagreement detectors
and several modified variations provided the basic means for detecting
errors in the computer system under study. The outputs of these de-
tectors were "OR'd" together in a logical network to provide the basic
means for fault isolation.
The sim" _,ator was used to determine optimum placement and
timing of the detector in the computer system and to evaluate the error
detecting efficiency of the built-in test circuitry. In several hundred
failure simulations, over 99 percent of all simulated failures were de-
tected. Simulation also proved that failure isolation to a replaceable
module level was attained in the reorganized computer system by the
disagreement detector "OR'ing" network.
Module and channel switching, both a',tomatic and manual, were
,,_ investigated as inflight techniques for improving system reliability and
for supporting maintenance activities. Single channel operation of some
modules or of the entire system for selected mission phases or opera-
tional conditions was considered.
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Tw9 few mcdes o: operation were derived: 1) TMR/Simplex and
2) TMR/Switchable _pare. In the TMR/Simplex mode, one or more
modules of the system may operate simplex while the remainder of the
system operates TMR. One operational simplex module is turned off
with every failed simplex moQ_l]e, resulting in an appreciable system
reliability inc,'ease over the basic TMR mode. An even greater reliabil-
ity increase is provided (at the cost of additional test and switching cir-
cuitry) by the switchable spare mode in which the turned off operational
module is made available as a spare for the operating simplex module
in the TMR/Simplex mode.
For maximum long-term reliability in noncritical phases of the
mission, the system may be operated ip the simplex mode with two in-
operative channels available as built-in spax-es. The "multiprocessing"
potential ol operating the three channels of the TMR system as three in-
dependent systems capable of Delfforming independent functions of life-
support system processing, experimental system processing, and ve-
hicle control (for example) has been found to be feasible. Further study
is required to achieve this potential, however, by developing means for
decL,_pling channgls, as well as simply controlling their on-off s_tus.
The voting and switching logic developed during the study has
made possible an on-line repair capability for the comp_lter system
while operating in the TMR mode. Failed modules may be replaced
with spare modules without interrupting normal operation ._f the system.
Similarly, au_matic self-repair capability is feasible with the new
logic by instrumenting a fourth or spare channel. The new logic will
detect a disagreement between the three operating channels, isolate the
failure to the specific module and channel, turn off the failed s,_mplex
module, and switch in the spare from the inoperative fourth cha_mel.
A primary goal was defined early in the study to automate the er-
ror detection and fault isolation functions and thereby minimize crew
requirements for inflight maintenance. Training, experience, and test
information required by the crew to effect repair were made negligible
by the hardware approaches pursued in the study. Man-in-the-loop op-
erations required by the AES instrumentation were limited to reading
a bank of indicator lights to determine the location of a failure and to
making a manual replacement of the failed module. Test and packaging
approaches were directed toward elim/nating the need for special test
equipment or special tools to effect inflight maintenance. Semiautomatic
repair methods in which the astronaut switches in wired-in spare mod-
ules or changes operating mode were also investigated, as well au fully
automatic repair and mode changing.
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3.4 Fabrication and Test
Limited fabrication and test was required in _he study to prove the
feasibility of inflight maintenance in a high humidity, zero gravity environ-
ment.
A nonfunctional mockup was fabricated of the reconfigured computer
system illustrating the organizational and packaging concepts selected
during the study for AES applications. As shown in the photograph of
Figure 6, a depar_.h _ from _he conventional sealed uait designs of aero-
space computers was made in favor of individually sea_d modules. In
this packaging approach the only sealing problem_ lie with the connec-
tors -- both module and cable connectors.
Exploratory tests performed on the Saturn V page connectors re-
sulted in the selection of a gasket-silicone gel sealing technique for the
AES connectors. Several connectors were loaded with silicone gr-, Je
and tested for contact resistance and leakage resistance between adjacent
pins. The grease had no measurable effect on contact re,_istance for
all connectors tested. Immersion tests for leakage resist_mce showed
the need for a gasket in addition to the grease to provide a pin-wiping
action both on insertion and disconnect of the male half of the connector
with the female. With the gasket-grease combination, the connectors
were mated and remated while immersed in salt water with no appreci-
able change in megger readings between adjacent pins.
Nine representative replaceable modules were prepared to illus-
trate a solution to the problem of packaging and sparing for the adverse
AES environment by modifying Saturn V breadboard computer logic
pages. The page itself was sealed with a rubber compound (RTV) and
the female connector (in the test equipment) which mates with the page
was prepared with the gasket-silicone gel combination. A photograph
of a modified module and _he mating female connector is shown in Fig-
ure 7.
A special environmental test chamber was fabricated (Figure 8) to
provide simulation of the high humidity, zero gravity AES environment.
The water tank on the lower left-hand side of the chamber is equipped
with heater, blower, and controls to produce a relative humidity varing
between 80 and 100 percent. The temperature within the chamber was
maintained in the region of 100°F to 125°F. To simulate the migration
effects of free moisture to electrical connectors in zero gravity, a
water solution of 0. 22-percent sodium chloride and up to 1 percent urea,%
w,_ sprayed on the test modules once each hour for the entire continuous
test period of 58 da},s. An electrical charge was applied to the spray
to simulate ionization of free moisture. Rubber gloves sealed to one
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wall of the chamber allowed modules to be unmated and remated at inter-
vals during the test period without affecting the chamber environment,
thus simulating maintenance activity (module replacement) and perhaps
the suited astronaut conditions.
Figure 6. Computer Mockup
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Figure 7. Representative Replaceable Module
A Phase II testing program was initiated on 4 October to evaluate
the gasket-silicone gel technique for sealing connectors. Although the
purpose of Phase II testing was not to evaluate sealing of the module it-
self (replaceable modules in the AES computer would be hermetically
sealed as individual components), the Saturn V pages used to represent
AES replaceable modules had to be sealed to prevent logic failures in
the high humidity environment while testing the connector sealing tech-
nique.
DC voltages were applied to certain pins of each module, and ap-
proximately 20 pins were monitored on each module for changes in the
resulting static patterns. Very few test points showed any appreciable
change in voltage level during the first month of testing although the
magnesium-lithium frames of the Saturn V logic pages showed drastic
deterioration, Those test points which did exhibit appreciable change
(over 5 or 10 millivolts) weze found to be located on those pages show-
ing the most frame deterioration indicating that the voltage changes
resulted from moisture leakage around the frames (under the RTV seal)
"_ rather than at the connector.
28
1966011714-033
29
1966011714-034
On 7 Novemuer the tests were interrupted by a failure of the testchamber. A connection came loose from the water tank causing a
flooded condition and drastic changes in the temperature-humidity en-
vironment. A rash of voltage changes occurred at this time, especiallyon those modules exhibiting the most frame deterioration.
It is difficult to define a voltage change as a failure, since the op-
eration of is on-off in nature. Even the most drasticdigital systerns
' changes in voltage leveis monitored during the test may not cause a
logic failure in actual practice. For the purpose of this discussion, how-
ever, a logic failure is defined as a voltage change of over 25 milUvolts.
Of the nine representative modules, six exhibited no failures until
I the test chamber failed (a test period of over a month). Two modules
survived the and exhibited no failures for the entire test period (57flood
days). One module exhibited one failure: and a second module exhibited
two failures after the flood. One of the modules which operated per-
t fectly up to tt.e time of the flood had to be disconnected following the test
e£'aipment failure because it began to draw excessive current from the
power supplies.
One mod-ale exhibited two failures during the first month of testing.
Another module lasted 20 days of testing before experiencing its first
failure and then degraded rapidly. The ninth module experienced three
failures after only a few days of test and then stabilized until the flood,
aftez which it degraded rapidly.
Only one module out of the nine had to be removed from the tester
| due to drawing excessive current, however. Eight finished the test
period of 57 days.In general, the frequency of failures could be correlated with de-
terioration of the magnesium-lithium frame (causing the RTV seal to
pe_l off the circuit board). The failure mechanisms seemed, therefore,
to be a moisture lea2_age under the edge of the RTV seal rather than by
means of the connectors. Detailed examination and disecth_g of the failed
modules supported this conclusion.
Although it is believed that the connector sealing technique was
proven by the evaluation test, further testing is planned (under IBM fund-
ing, since the AES-EPO study period has concluded) with better sealed
• modules to eliminate rao@ale failures and provide further proof of the
? connector sealing cap;_bilities. These tests will be reported to NASA-
t MSC.
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4.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The two major objectives of the study have been achieved. A
TMR computer system derived by reconfig-aring the Saturn V guidance
computer and the Apollo backup data adapter was shown to be a
feasible solution to the time critical reliability problem. Also, a
detailed investigatiou of inflight maintenance (including module and
channel switching) as a means of solving the long term reliability
probiem was generally successful in all areas affecting maintenance
activities including error detection, failure isolation, and module
replacement in the high humidity, zero gravity AES environment.
4.1 Mission Requirements
The mission reliability requirements of 0. 9994 for the 90-day
mission period and 0. 999999 for the critical phases of the mission
were shown by the study to be feasible in a computer system provided
only that one is willing to pay the cost of triple modular redundancy,
built-in test and switching circuitry, and spares. Automatic error
detection and fault isolation can be instrumented to relieve the inflight
: crew of the nearly impossible task of diagnosing error symptoms in
complex digital systems. Automatic self-repair of the computer
system was found m the study to be legible. Also, manual repair
(module replacement) was proved by laboratory test to be feasible in
the adverse AES environment.
4.2 TMR Organization
The apportioned computer-data adapter reliability was specified
to be 0. 999999 for the critical phases of the 90-day earth polar crbit
mission. The most critical phase of the mission for wh'_ch the reliability
estimates were made was the boost phase with arL effective time period
of 10.8 hours (obtained by multiplying real boost time by estimated
environmental stress factors). The estimated reliability of the
reconfigured computer system in its basic TMR mode of operation
somewhat exceeded the requirement. In the TMR/Simplex mode of
operation, where a module containing a component failure may be
operated simplex while the rest of the modules operate TMR, mL even
: greater reliability marghl was realized with the reconfigured computer.
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I ofthisstudyisthata TMR machine organizationA conclusion
shouldbe consideredfor any mission containingcriticalphases during
which normal opelationcannotbe suspended toperform testsor to
make repah's.
i 4.3 InflightMaintenance
The apportioned computer-data adapter reliability was specified. to be 0. 9994 for the 90-day earth polar orbit mission. The estimated
reliability of the reconfigured computer system in its basic TMR mode
of operation without inflight maintenance was 0. 9979. In the TMR/
t Simplex was 9984, and for the Switchable Spare
mode the estimate 0.
mode (inwhich the switched-outgood module of the TM-R/Sim!:lexmode
is made available as a built-in spare in case of a second failure in the
i same module)the estimateexceeded the mission requirement.
Althoughspare modules are notrequiredto meet +_hemission
reliability requirement i/the Switchable Spare mode is instrumented,a redefinition of the critical phase is necessary if no pares are
carried on the AES-EPO mission. Since re-entry (defined as a
critical phase in the study) is the last phase of the mission, it will beinitiated with a computer system which is not fully TMR. The ac-
cumulated failures over the 90 days have not been corrected by
replacing failed modules with spares so that the reliability of entry
t cannot exceed the mission reliability. The entire mission, including
re-entry, could be accomplished with a reliability exceeding 0.999,
however.
The spares requirements for the TMR mode of operation (assum-
ing that the TMR/Simplex or Switchable Spares modes are not instru-
i mented) are listed in Table 9. The spares requirements for the TMR/Simplex mode were not estimated but will be somewhat less. The
spares requirements for all three modes will be identical to Table 9 if
a 0.999999-reliability requirement is imposed on the re-entry phase.
I Error detection and fault isolation studies were performed using
the Saturn V System Simulator to determine the feasibility of this
I aspect of inflight maintenance. Automatic error detection by means ofbuilt-in test circuitry and without the need for special test programs
> was demonstrated in both the Saturn Y and AES computer configurations
"_ with an efficiency of over 99 percent (over 99 percent of the simulated
! errors were detected). Automatic failure isolation by means of built-in
test circuitry was found to be feasible to the same degree of efficiency.
Error detection and diagnosis functions are therefore not required of the
I crew.
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The repairstudiesincludedbothmanual and automatictechniques.
Manual repairwas implemented conceptuallyby providingthe crew with
an error displayboard withan errc- lightindicatingeach replaceable
module. Automatic and semiautomaticrepairconceptsincludedvarious
switchinginstrumentations,usuallyautomat.icwith manual override
capabilities.Ifinstallationconstraintspermit, a TMR computer system
could be instrumented with a wired-i,,_,, fourth (spare) chazmel and ._'"'-',...j
automatic error detecti m, failure isolation, and functional replacement
of the failed module with a spare from the fourth channel.
Sealing studies including laboratory test proved the feasibility of
designing modularized equipment to operate and be maintained in a high
humidity, zero gravity environment. The conventional unit sealing
techniques requiring overpressurization, relief valves, and purging
were abandoned in favor of sealing the individual replaceable moa_ales
and providing protection for the exposed connectors. A gasket-silicone
gel technique for protecting the connectors proved highly satisfactory
in laboratory tests.
4.4 General
The module and channel switching studies required in the state-
ment of work led into several interesting potential capabilities for TMR
organizations. Although a thorough examination of these potential
capabilities was beyond the scope of the study, sufficient effort was
expended to determine that feasibility depended only upon the develop-
ment of error detection and switching circuits with specific character-
istics, and an appreciable amount of effort was therefore expended in
the area of detectic_ and switching.
As mentioned in the previous section, a self-repairing TMR
computer sys,em can be realized by means of wired-in spares and
• circuitry which will automatically detect errors, isolate the failures to
specific channels within the failed modules, and switch in the spare
in place of the failed element. These required detection, diagnostic,
and switching functions can be supplied by the switchable voter developed
: during the study and described in Section 5 of this report.
TMR machine organiz_ion possesses inherent capabilities for
:_ nmltimode operation which have not been realized in practice. A
;_ TMR/Simplex mode (in which one or more modules of the machine
may be operated simplex while the remaining modules operate TMR)
i:i was shown in the study to provide appreciable increase in mission
't 33
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and critical phase reliabiY.ies over the conventional TMR mode. A
i Switchable Y._are mode (in which a failure can be tolerated in each of
those module_, in the TMR/Simplex mode which have switched to
simplex operation) was shown to provide an additional reliability in-
." crease over the TMR/Simplex mode.
_ thc voters are redesigned so that the three channels of the
TMR organization can be functionally isolated rather than selectively
turned off, a "nmltiprocessing" mode would be feasible in which each
:i channel c-,m operate as a separate computer. In orbital activities, for
example, one channel could perform the data management function
related to experiments, another channel could perform a similar
function related to life support, and the third could perform navigation
and vehicle control functions. With somewhat more complexity in the
addressing scheme (allowing each channel access _o the memories of
the other two channels), the chammls cou!d operate independently on
different phases of the same complex problem. Even further, on ap
extremely complex problem in three dimension_, each channel could
handle the computations involving components along one of the three
coordinate axes.
TMR machine organization seems to be especially applicable to
those missions which contain critical phases requiring extremely high
reliability for relatively short periods of time and noncritical phases
which may be interrupted in case of failure but which require relatively
large data handling capacity. The TMR organization provides the high
reliability for the critical phases and the three independent channels
provide the large data management capacity for the noncritical phases.
34
1966011714-039
